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“...we wish that we could have focussed
more on how work could be made more
cooperative, and on how issues of quality
of work and democracy in the workplace
could be brought to life. The book Computers and Democracy (Bjerknes et al.
1987) was essential background for
many of us, and the issues of democracy
that it raised have been swept to the side
here as we focused on how to foster cooperation between designers and users.

While we didn’t explicitly address concepts of democracy in the workplace, it
is clear to us that the issue of building cooperation is a first step on that path. For
us, democracy in the workplace means
expanding choices for workers and developing working strategies that allow
more voices to be heard.” (Greenbaum &
Kyng, Design at Work, 1991, p. 276)
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Introduction
Scandinavian Journal of Information
Systems has invited us to elaborate on
the points raised in our PDC’92 paper
(Kraft & Bansler 1992) and by Morten
Kyng’s response. We are grateful for the
opportunity to further discuss these issues.
Morten Kyng and his colleagues are
pioneers in forcefully raising issues of
workplace participation and the design
of workplace technologies. No one disputes their influence on Scandinavian
trade unions, the research programs of
Scandinavian academics and the broader
discussions of industrial reorganization
now taking place in Europe and North
America.
We agree with Kyng that CRA and
related research approaches have not
stood still. The place and function of
CRA, of cooperative design and of other
“Scandinavian” approaches today strike
us as very different from their original
form and focus. CRA in 1994 is not the
CRA of 1977 or 1987. This was precisely the point of our PDC’92 presentation.
We took the opportunity at that conference to compare the original goals and
methods of CRA researchers to what
they actually did. We concluded that early CRA “action research programs” confronted a corporatist Scandinavian industrial relations system which in practice made it difficult, if not impossible, to
realize the democratic claims of early
CRA strategists. We concluded, furthermore, that the CRA strategy as originally
conceived had no chance of being implemented in the U.S. precisely because it
assumed a centralized industrial relations structure which had absolutely no
counterpart in the US. It is now time to

address in more detail where the CRA
has evolved beyond the point described
in our conference paper.
We agree that the Collective Resource Approach has changed, as Kyng
insists. We insist, further, that it is also
necessary to spell out how it has
changed. We agree that there are at least
three distinct generations of CRA-related projects. We think it is obvious that
each generation has gradually shifted its
focus from strategies which advance the
interests of workers confronting new
technologies to the management and organization of designer-user cooperation.
The Collective Resource Approach has,
in other words, successively moved further away from the politics of the labor
process and of work organization and
moved closer to the design of technology. In practice this means an increasing
preoccupation with design methods, user
interfaces and other “artifacts.”
At the same time, however, there has
not been a parallel shift in language. For
researchers like Kyng, designer-user cooperation means the same thing as workplace democratization. We don’t accept
this identity. The democratic potential
inherent in one is very different from the
other. Providing workers, at least a few
privileged ones, with a greater selection
of tools is a worthwhile project. In itself,
however, such technocratic tinkering
does little to address fundamental issues
of power and control in the work place,
for example, the pace and intensity of
work—or whether there will be any
work at all, and for whom.
Furthermore, sponsors of the Collective Resource Approach have recently
shifted their geographic as well as their
substantive focus. Originally conceived
as a union strategy for dealing with Scan-
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dinavian employers, CRA techniques are
now being exported to the U.S. We think
it is appropriate here to raise questions
about how well such a distinctively
Scandinavian product travels. In particular, recent changes in U.S. industrial relations—notably the nearly total rout of
U.S. unions and the emergence there of a
growing contingent work force—raise
the possibility that the consequences of
applying CRA techniques will be very
different in the American context than
they have been in Scandinavia.

CRA Practice in Scandinavia
We agree with Kyng that it is tedious and
unproductive to engage in an exchange
of dueling quotations. Fortunately, the
editors of Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems have reproduced our
PDC’92 paper and readers can judge for
themselves whether we have “misrepresented” CRA researchers. However, we
feel compelled to directly address three
matters, two general and one specific.
First, Kyng systematically describes
our assessments of CRA implementation
in Scandinavia as if they were merely our
own opinions, with no evidence to support them. He summarizes “our” arguments, but neglects to point out that our
appraisal of CRA successes and failures
was based in large measure on the conclusions of Danish researchers, whose
work was duly noted in our text. The assessment of CRA’s actual practice is held
by more Scandinavian researchers than
Kyng cares to acknowledge. (See also
the collection of articles in Deltagelse i
teknologisk udvikling (Clausen et al.
1992) as well as the recent articles by

Lorentzen & Clausen (1990) and by
Clausen & Langaa Jensen (1993).)
Kyng also knows—or should
know—that our analysis of CRA in
Scandinavia was also drawn from an extensive, long-term research project we
conducted on the politics of technology
introduction in Denmark. The original
project report (Kraft & Bansler 1989)
has long been available in Scandinavia
and the revised version, now available as
a journal article (Kraft & Bansler 1993),
was cited in our PDC’92 paper.
Second, Kyng has the habit of rearranging chronologies to suit his case. For
example, we described the early visits of
CRA researchers to the U.S. and their reception by U.S. audiences in the late
1970’s and early 1980’s. We said, in effect, that these early visits were missionary-like in their zeal and optimistic projections. Kyng chides us because we cite,
among several contemporary and historical reports, Computers and Democracy
(Bjerknes et al. 1987). He quotes a cautionary paragraph from there to prove
that CRA researchers were not naïve. We
accept his claim. CRA researchers were
properly cautious—in 1987. In 1980,
however, “the Scandinavian Model”
meant for Americans more or less the
happy versions of DEMOS, DUE, and
the original Norwegian Iron and Metal
Workers Union project retailed by a
steady stream of visitors from Stockholm, Aarhus and Oslo.
Kyng says that CRA researchers
have always understood the limits placed
on their political strategies by the Scandinavian industrial relations systems and
the corporatist nature of union-employer
relations. By way of proof, Kyng quotes
from a well-known CRA report pub-
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lished a decade after the early visits to
the U.S.:
But there are basic obstacles as
well. The most important one being the limited resources at the
local union’s disposal. The strategy is extremely resource-consuming from the trade union’s
point of view, and even if it does
its best the local union cannot really compete with management.
Sandberg remarks that ‘in our
type of society, it is seldom in the
position to build up a knowledge
base, or plans which compare to
those of management in quantity
and quality’ even if it has the advantage of being better able to involve employees and use their
experience. This is true even if
management is not always the
well informed protagonist it is
sometimes assumed to be. (Ehn
& Kyng 1987, pp. 42-43)
This is a ritualistic disclaimer. The sentences Kyng chooses to reproduce are
prefaced with a very different assessment of the practical outcomes of CRA:
In practice the strategy has
proved workable and most useful, thus demonstrating strong
support for the [union participation and negotiation] hypothesis
above. (Ehn & Kyng 1987, p. 42)
Third, we did make a mistake in saying
that the funding of early CRA projects
came from the national unions and main
organizations rather than from the Scandinavian governments. We should have
been more precise, particularly when one
of our goals was to acquaint US researchers with the corporatist nature of

politics, trade unionism, and industrial
relations—and industrial relations research—in Scandinavia. The best description of the actual funding process
for the earliest CRA projects comes from
Kyng himself1:
We wrote a relatively detailed
grant application [for the Council
of Technology2], which was relatively explicit politically—at
least compared with what the
Council of Technology was used
to getting. We therefore had a lot
of problems getting the grant.
The council was not keen on
funding a project which was to
be conducted in collaboration
with labor. The reason we finally
got the money was that we had a
Social Democratic government at
the time, and that the people
from the Confederation of Danish Workers’ Organizations (the
LO) had notified the Council unofficially that unless we received
funding then the Council’s composition would be changed.
(Bansler 1987, pp. 65-66)
This was the “meaning” of the paragraph
Kyng urges the reader to ignore. (For the
benefit of Scandinavian readers, we reproduce the original Danish-language interview in Footnote #1).

The Export of CRA inspired
Techniques to the U. S.
We now turn to the other main point of
our original paper, one which Kyng has
chosen to ignore. In his comment, Kyng
is reticent about the export potential of
the “Scandinavian approach” to cooper-
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ative design. But, in Design at Work,
Greenbaum & Kyng (1991) are considerably less reserved: “To us, it is clear
that the time is ripe for mixing and
matching the Scandinavian traditions
discussed in this book with American
projects that focus on user involvement
(pp. 13-14).”
In the same paragraph, Greenbaum &
Kyng make the following observation
about the potential for exporting the
“Scandinavian approach” to the US:
Some American systems designers have said that although they
like the Scandinavian approach,
they feared that it wasn’t applicable in the United States because
of the weak trade union movement. Scandinavia’s high degree
of union membership, however,
may only be a partial blessing for
participatory design, for in those
countries, as in the U.S., established unions sometimes tend to
be stuck in their ways. On the
other hand, American discussions about cooperative work and
team approaches to work tasks,
while perhaps overstated in the
business press, nevertheless point
out some fertile ground for planting seeds for cooperative design
(Greenbaum & Kyng 1991, p.
14).
Here we have it: a more or less final rejection of unions as the locus of participation and of cooperative design and the
suggestion that fertile ground for CRA in
the U.S. is being prepared in the business
press. Unions are no longer crucial. The
political-strategic component of the Collective Resource Approach is no longer
the organizing principle. The “Scandina-

vian approach” is now safe for export to
the union-free U.S.
We refer the reader to our paper for
our analysis of the Scandinavian industrial relations system and its impact on
the practical implementation of CRA.
We think it might be useful, however, to
specify a bit further the cultural and political contexts in which CRA-inspired
techniques are likely to be organized and
implemented in the United States.

Power and Privilege
First, some background. In the U.S.,
competitive pressures have forced managers into a painful reassessment of
long-standing and widespread Taylorist
work organization. European and especially Asian competitors have caused
U.S. employers to undertake drastic reorganizations in order to compete in global markets. U.S. managers are in the
process of transforming their organizations to be adaptable, flexible and responsive to constant change—“lean and
mean.” In particular, senior U.S. managers are now convinced that intellectual
and conceptual delays, not restrictive
work practices on the shop floor, are the
main obstacles to timely production of
competitive products. For management
theorists and practitioners, the most
threatening problem facing U.S. industry
is the unreliable and sporadic nature of
intellectual and administrative valueadding activities. Value-adding workers
directly contribute to the process of
transforming a partially complete product into a deliverable commodity. Those
who do not, in contrast, only police and
bookkeep goods-in-process.
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In short, the new culprits in the competitive/quality dilemma of American industry are designers and middle managers. More quickly operationalizing their
intellectual production—or eliminating
those who merely guard or bookkeep—
is the key to the survival of the firm, the
industry, and even of U.S. manufacturing as a whole. Managers are not very
concerned, by contrast, with the work
force of production and service workers.
They don’t need to be. The huge U.S.
private sector has a union density of
about 12% and work stoppages of all
kinds have reached a post-World War II
low.
Managerial criticisms have therefore
focused on rigid hierarchies, linear product development cycles and the hidden
organizational costs of employees who
do not “add value” or add value quickly
enough. Although they may not cite Perrow or Gouldner, management and engineering literatures reflect a keen awareness of the contradictions of trying to
control and inspire at the same time (Cf.
Klein & Kraft 1994).
Increasingly, U.S. managers have
settled on a combination of normative
control strategies, in the sense described
by Kunda (1992), and organizational/
technical strategies which rely heavily
on pushing supervisory and some design
decisions down the chain of command
on to “self-directed teams.” These are,
however, special sorts of teams, very different from those found in Scandinavian
work places. The American teams are
based on Total Quality Management
(TQM) principles, which combine a set
of engineering tools, including statistical
process control and process and product
simulation, with a new organizational
strategy. The organizational strategy is

called “empowerment.” Although managers claim that “empowerment” constitutes a rejection of Taylorist fragmentation, in practice it means little more than
work intensification, administered by a
combination of sophisticated monitoring
systems and what Parker & Slaughter
(1988) called “management by stress.”
No unions are present to advocate for
workers: they are no longer needed because the interests of employees are
identical to the interests of the enterprise.
This, too, is corporatism, but a different
sort than the kind found in Scandinavia.
It is against this background that we
must raise several questions:
First, who will use CRA tools and
techniques in the U.S.? In other words,
who will be the customers? It is difficult
to overstate the difference between European participation systems and those
which are called by similar names in the
United States. Given the almost complete absence of formal state-labor-management collaborative structures in the
U.S., what constitutes “cooperation,”
“participation” and “empowerment” is
decided by employers, not workers. This
is a very peculiar kind of participation.
Even in industries with a relatively high
density of union members, such as auto,
union participation is effectively shaped
by management. For example, in the
Paid Education Leave (PEL) program,
which laid the foundation for TQMbased projects at General Motors, union
involvement in the design and content of
the program was on GM’s terms. The
agendas and definitions were set by the
auto company (cf. Leary & Menaker
1993)3. The “customers” for CRA in the
United States, then, are employers, not
designers and certainly not ordinary
workers.
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Second, in what ways will the product be modified for American tastes?
When CRA-inspired techniques are introduced unilaterally by managers, the
goals must be different than when they
are negotiated between organized workers and employers. For U.S. managers,
teamwork and participation are ways to
increase output by refining command
and control strategies, not abolishing
them. Thus U.S. managers are likely to
“cherry pick” those aspects of “the Scandinavian model” they find useful for
their own ends and integrate them with
familiar strategies—“mixing and matching” in Greenbaum and Kyng’s apt
phrase. The likelihood, in other words, is
that selected CRA cherries will be added
to other favored techniques, such as
“management by stress,” which seem
opposed to the liberatory intent of CRA.
(Even where there are unions, as the Aftonbladet experience illustrates, employers are tempted to ignore the implicit social contract which calls for substantive
rather than ritual participation.)
Third, what are the likely practical
effects on work place organization and
labor-management relations? It seems to
us there is a fundamental difference between self-organization and self-policing. “Empowerment” in the U.S. means
establishing behavioral guidelines and
measurable outcomes for employees. It
means substituting peer-pressure and
team-based group pay for direct coercion
by middle managers and supervisors.
This is the purpose, for example, of elaborate Statistical Process Control systems,
continuous feedback loops, real-time
monitoring systems, user-friendly workstations and the other “design aids”
which define “self-directed high performance work groups” in the U.S. U.S.

design workers, given the nearly total absence of both unions and a cultural tradition of autonomous workplace cooperation, therefore can be little more than
passive consumers of the most recent
management import. CRA, in other
words, becomes just another in a long
line of technocratic quick fixes of which
U.S. managers are so fond.
Still, CRA-inspired tools have the
potential for making design work more
interesting for relatively privileged technical workers. They may even help make
better systems. But in the American context, these cooperative tools will almost
certainly also be used by managers to reinforce distinctions between designer
and user, not blur them. Users will remain objects of the design process, not
active participants, except in the most
formal way. Users and other ordinary
workers will find their work analyzed
and reorganized to change their behavior
for greatest “efficiency” (cf. Klein &
Kraft 1994).
In this respect, the articles by the
Scandinavian and U.S. researchers in
Design at Work (Greenbaum & Kyng
1991) provide a striking illustration of
these divergent approaches to “participatory design.” The Scandinavian authors
write about cooperation between designers and users. The U.S. authors write
about studying work and work place relations. This is precisely what U.S. managers do when they “reengineer” workplaces to maximize output, reduce cycle
time and get rid of workers who don’t
add value fast enough.
Fourth, who is likely not to be affected by CRA-inspired tools and techniques? In the Scandinavian countries,
the definitions of a skilled worker—indeed the very concepts of skill and com-
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petence themselves—reflect a complex
process of negotiation between the trade
unions, the Ministries of Industry and
Education and the employers’ associations. In the U.S., definitions of who and
what skilled workers are reside entirely
with employers and managers in non-union workplaces. Today you are a high
value-adding professional, tomorrow
you are so much deadwood. The unilateral power to define skill as well as participation, usefulness as well as empowerment, is unchecked by contract or custom. The selective adoption of some
CRA design and management techniques may make the work of some designers and other relatively privileged
workers more effective and even more
fun, but in the absence of real structural
changes in American industrial relations,
CRA tools and methods can only intensify, not ameliorate, the rapid polarization
now taking place in U.S. workplaces.
Such trends, obviously, are not
unique to the U.S., but the effects of massive economic and political realignments
are more pronounced in the U.S. than in
most of Western Europe precisely because of the unorganized and fragmented
nature of labor-management relations.
Clausen & Lorentzen (1993), for instance, talk about “rationalization-winners” with the most interesting jobs and
“rationalization-loosers” who get the
most boring jobs with unattractive working hours. The privileged are getting
more privileged while the vulnerable are
made conveniently invisible.

Summary and Questions
The Collective Resource Approach in
Scandinavia began as a political move-

ment, not a technological one. It was this
original political content—that local
workers could and must challenge management definitions of skill and technological legitimacy—which threatened a
cozy system of centralized industrial relations which valued historical and political collaboration almost as much as productivity and profits. The collective resistance of Scandinavian unions and
employers forced a change in the original concept of the CRA to a much more
narrowly defined technocratic focus on
design and interfaces rather than worker
control and an independent vision of
technology.
In the U.S., the absence of a formal
system of centralized industrial relations, of universal union membership,
and of a strong overlap of unions and political parties, means that the technocratic, not political, components of CRA will
be selected or rejected by employers
solely on the basis of their utility to managers. The terms “cooperation,” “participation,” and “empowerment” will all be
used to describe this process. None of
these, however, can have anything to do
with work place democratization.
Even in Scandinavia, with its very
different traditions of industrial relations, cooperation and participation for
the few cannot mean, as Kyng would
have it, that “democracy in the workplace means expanding choices for
workers and developing working strategies that allow more voices to be heard.”
This is little more than dressed up—and
discredited—sociotechnical “participation” in its most elitist form.
If the Collective Resource Approach
is to advocate genuine democracy—and
seriously address the issue of power and
control in the modern work place—we

J. P. Bansler & P. Kraft 104

http://aisel.aisnet.org/sjis/vol6/iss1/1

8

Bansler and Kraft: PRIVILEGE AND INVISIBILITY IN THE NEW WORK ORDER: A REPLY TO KYNG

think it must confront directly and forthrightly at least the following issues:
How will the CRA advance or retard
a new polarization of the work force in
both unionized and nonunion societies?
In unionized work places, how can
the CRA avoid the danger of the shop
steward becoming the management’s
“hostage” because of the disparity in union and employer resources?
What can be done to check the trend
towards company corporatism, where
workers’ loyalty is directed towards the
company (or “team”) and away from the
union and labor movement?
We do not believe the outcome to
these questions is determined. On the
contrary, the ongoing changes in technology and work organization are open
to policy-oriented initiatives—by researchers, employees and unions. In particular, Scandinavian trade unions are
being challenged to develop a new and
more powerful strategy to deal with issues of technology and organization.
The question then is whether unions
will be able to develop a new role in relation to the transformation of working
life caused by the rapid development of
technology and new forms of work place
organization. This is mainly a question
of strategy—not of tools. There is an obvious need for a revitalization of the debate on these strategic issues. Our paper
was an attempt to reopen that discussion.

Notes
1This

quotation comes from an interview with
Morten Kyng, conducted by Bansler in November
1985. The original Danish-language interview, in
which Kyng describes the funding process of the
DUE-project, reads as follows:
Vi skrev en forholdsvis detaljeret projektan-

søgning [til Teknologirådet], som nok også
var forholdsvis eksplicit politisk—ihvertfald i
sammenligning med, hvad de var vant til i
Teknologirådet. Der var derfor store problemer med at få pengene. Rådet brød sig ikke
om at støtte et partsforskningsprojekt i samarbejde med fagbevægelsen. Grunden til, at vi i
sidste ende fik pengene, var vel, at vi på det
tidspunkt havde en socialdemokratisk
regering, og at LO-folkene sørgede for, at det
uofficielt blev meddelt rådet, at hvis der ikke
blev givet penge til det her projekt, ville
rådets sammensætning blive ændret. (Bansler
1987, pp. 65-66)
In an interview with Kristen Nygaard, conducted in
December 1985, Nygaard similarly explains the
funding process with regard to the NJMF project in
Norway:
Der var ingen problemer med at få støtte fra
NTNF? Selvom det var Norges første partsforskningsprojekt for fagbevægelsen?
Nej, egentlig ikke; men de fik jo også at vide,
at hvis denne ansøgning blev afslået, ville det
se ejendommeligt ud, og det ville være et
afslag, som mange stortingsmedlemmer ville
være interesserede i at høre en nærmere
begrundelse for. (Bansler 1987, p. 42)
Pelle Ehn, in an interview conducted in November
1985, says about the funding of the UTOPIA
project:
Hvordan stillede svensk LO sig til UTOPIA?
Fra LO’s side var støtten til UTOPIA meget
valen. Det hænger formodentlig sammen
med, at ved slutningen af DEMOS-projektet
havde LO ændret sin officielle politik og var
begyndt at kritisere os. De var derfor ikke så
varme på at støtte et nyt projekt med de
samme mennesker. (Bansler 1987, p. 59)
2Teknologirådet (The Technology Council) was a
government institution that sponsored research and
development projects to promote technological
development in the Danish trades and industries. It
was abolished in 1991. The Technology Council
consisted of 12 members appointed by the minister
of industry and trade. Council members were private and public employers, researchers and consultants as well as worker representatives.
3
At a recent IFIP conference in Vienna, Libby
Bishop presented a case study of a high tech firm in
California whose employees had begun using the
company BBS to criticize management personnel
policies. Managers responded by pulling the plug
on the BBS. The Europeans at the Vienna conference were incredulous and asked, “where were the
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unions? where was the works council?” The Americans in turn asked, “what unions? what works
council?”
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